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Flávio Henrique Silva Ferreira, Juiz de Fora / Brazil 
 
Technological Change, Accident Prevention and Civil Liability 
 
Abstract:  The improvement of accident prevention technology in many fields of social life has spurred 
new challenges to the doctrinal tools of fault and strict based civil liability in the law of torts. Amid 
these challenges lies the identification of the proper scope of the respective criteria of liability in a 
changing factual environment, their suitability as doctrinal tools, as well as their actual application to 
concrete cases given the amount of information which would be needed to render adequate judgments. 
Precedents and old laws should be assessed with caution, taking into account the tacit cost-benefit 
analysis embedded in them, for they may or may not serve the interests of welfare maximization in an 
environment with constantly renewed accident prevention technology. 
Key-words:  technological  change,  precautionary  measures,  accident  prevention  technologies, 
negligence, strict liability 
 
I. Introduction 
Accidents occur in many different shapes and forms in various fields of human activity such 
as traffic related accidents involving drivers, pedestrians and other road users; sports related 
accidents involving competitors or spectators; defective products related accidents involving 
consumers;  medical  care  related  accidents  involving  patients;  industry  related  accidents 
concerning the operation of hazardous activities which either affects the property and safety 
of employees or of the public at large. Prevention of accidents can usually be accomplished 
not only by the person or organization responsible for the creation of the risk of a given type 
of accident but also by its victim. However, we are here concerned mainly with the duties of 
prevention  imposed  on  injurers  rather  than  on  victims.  We  will  try  to  illustrate  how  a 
changing  factual  environment  regarding  the  development  of  new  and  improved  accident 
prevention technology in some selected fields of social life poses a challenge to the doctrinal 
tools of civil liability as well as to the precedential value of old laws, regulations and case-
law. When new accident  prevention technology emerges  it usually  alters the costs which 
would  have  to  be  borne  by  the  injurer/defendant  in  order  to  prevent  an  accident  from 
occurring,  either  lowering  or  increasing  them.  Sometimes  the  employment  of  this  new 
technology can be verified by the courts, other times it cannot. These changes affect the 
adequacy of the legal regime governing civil liability in those areas of social life. We will try 
to show how this can happen by developing a general theoretical framework for the law of 
torts  which  will  serve  as  a  yardstick  to  analyze  the  impact  of  said  technologies  on  the 2 
suitability of the aforementioned legal regime. First we will clarify what is the meaning of 
negligence or fault and compare it with strict liability. Then we will elucidate how and why 
the law provides  incentives  for the injurer to  behave more  carefully.  Afterwards we will 
identify the factors that bear on the choice between negligence and strict liability as well as 
the question of which precautionary measures should be included in the negligence inquiry. 
Finally we will analyze how new accident prevention technologies might impact the adequacy 
of the civil liability regime under the previously developed theoretical framework. However, 
before  we  do  all  of  the  above,  we  will  try  to  connect  the  theme  of  this  paper  to  moral 
philosophy. 
 
II. Connecting the theme of the paper to moral philosophy: welfare, fair allocation of 
resources and the law 
Law is assumed to be intimately related to the realization of justice, which is assumed to 
involve  questions  pertaining  to  the  fair  division  or  allocation  of  resources.
1  There is a 
considerable debate among moral philosophers whet her fair allocation of resources should 
pursue an egalitarian or other ideal, regardless of the promotion of people’s well-being or 
welfare,
2 or rather should pursue such ideals in order to advance said well -being or welfare.
3 
The very notion of well-being is the subject of acute debate. It has been identified with the 
promotion of people’s pleasures, actual preferences, ideal or rational preferences, attainment 
of a list of objective goods or even the pursuit of lives which are in accordance with human 
nature.
4 Equality itself, as a criterion of fairness, has multiple meanings. Fortunately, for the 
purposes of this paper, we need not resolve all of these issues. Civil liability for harm tends to 
reduce the overall costs of protection taken by the injurer an d the victim and, moreover, it 
tends to conserve their endowments and resources by diminishing the likelihood of an 
accident. Thus, even if one or both parties are expected to bear some costs in order to avoid 
some harm, they both are expected to be benefi ted by the fact that they will remain with a 
larger share of resources and endowments than they would otherwise have had in the absence 
of liability. This assumption holds, of course, only if the harm avoidance costs are less than 
the saved endowments and resources, or the activity of the injurer itself will not create greater 
                                                           
1 John Rawls, A  Theory of Justice, 1971; Ronald Dworkin, What  is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1981, 185-246; id., What is Equality? Part II: Equality of Resources, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 1981, 283-345; Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 2009. 
2 E.g., Rawls (note 1); Dworkin (note 1); Thomas Scanlon, What we Owe to Each Other,1998. 
3 E.g., James Griffin,  Well-being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance, 1986; Richard Arneson, 
Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, Philosophical Studies, 1989, 77-93; Roger Crisp, Reasons and the 
Good, 2006. 
4 For a brief review, see Griffin (note 3). 3 
endowments or resources and said injurer is not able to adequately and fully compensate the 
victim for the harm done. For, otherwise, it would not be clear whether the reduction of harm 
caused by civil liability would indeed create a larger share of resources and endowments to be 
distributed to the parties. 
Civil  liability  for  harm,  when  appropriate,  can  thus  be  accommodated  within  the 
framework of different  conceptions of justice or fair allocation. On the one hand, it may 
satisfy the requirements of non-welfarist theories of justice, such as the promotion of the ideal 
of equal respect for each other’s liberties and rights; or the deference given to deontological 
constraints against causing harm. On the other hand, it may also increase people’s well-being 
or  welfare  under  most,  if  not  all,  conceptions  of  well-being  or  welfare.  Having  greater 
amounts of resources and endowments allows people to pursue their chosen life plans with 
greater easiness, since they can be traded for or used for the accomplishment of things which 
are valuable to them, or allows them to obtain certain objective goods on their own, or allows 
them to pursue life plans which would be in accordance with their human nature, and so on. 
Reduction of harm caused in the context of social interactions can be equated with what 
economists call a “public good”.
5 Difficult questions would still remain about the fair division 
between the parties, injurer and victim, of the costs related to the creation of said public 
good.
6 These difficulties, however, do not alter the fact that it would be just and fair to have 
some  sort  of  rule  proscribing  the  causing  of  harm  by  careless  conduct  under  some 
circumstances. 
 
III. Basic assumptions about rationality, distributive justice and the relevance of the 
model presented in this paper 
The fact that various kinds of social interaction can result in unconsented harm, and that the 
reduction of said harm can be socially desirable, means that there may be room for legal 
intervention in order to achieve such reduction. Those who are familiar with the methodology 
employed in the economic analysis of law may skip this section. For those who are not so 
familiar, this section will lay out the basic assumptions guiding the analysis of the regime of 
civil  liability  pursued  in  the  next  sections  of  this  paper.  Let  us  begin  with  some  basic 
questions and short answers, and then we will elaborate a bit more on those questions and 
answers. When does the law need to provide rules in order to encourage parties to act in a way 
                                                           
5 For a general discussion of the notion of a “public good”, cf. Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of 
Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, 1996. 
6 For a very technical overview of different methods of fair allocation of benefits and burdens, cf. Hervé J. 
Moulin, Fair Division and Collective Welfare, 2003. 4 
that is socially desirable? Short answer: when “social” norms aren’t capable to steer their 
conduct towards such desirable outcome and “legal” norms can satisfactorily induce them to 
act in a socially beneficial manner. How can the incentives provided by “legal” norms be 
adequately analyzed? Short answer: by developing models of human interaction in specific 
contexts (game theory), which assume people possess a certain kind of rationality which will 
motivate them to seek certain kinds of rewards. These rewards or payoffs will vary, among 
other factors, according to the strategies taken by each party to the interaction as well as 
according to the legal rules and sanctions governing such interaction. 
Where do “social” norms come from and what is the nature of their relationship with 
“legal”  norms?  Social  norms  come  from  the  spontaneous  outcome  of  human  interactions 
within and outside the most varied groups in different fields of social life, while the more 
formal  legal  norms  are  the  result  of  an  institutionalization  process.
7  When  these  “social” 
norms, which come from different normative orders, begin to be supported by more well-
structured social sanctions, applied by official authorities, they then receive the qualification 
of “legal” norms.
8 Such “legal” norms are those “social” norms which have undergone a 
process of “institutionalization”.
9 Of course, the boundary between them is not as clear cut as 
it  may  sound.  The  fact  is  that  the  separation  between  the  normative  legal  tissue  and  the 
normative tissue which is not considered to attain the status of legally binding depends, to a 
great extent, on the purposes of the investigator. Thus, the distinguishing criteria may vary in 
accordance with the society and historical time under study.
10 The process of creation of legal 
norms through the adoption, elaboration and or modification of those social  norms already 
found  in  the  relevant  society  as  the  spontaneous  and  not  entirely  planned  outcome  of 
innumerous human interactions, carried out by formally constituted authorities, may be called 
                                                           
7 There is a growing literature on the nature and emergence of social norms. Cf., e.g., Michael Hechter and Karl-
Dieter Opp (eds), Social norms, 2001; Cristina Bicchieri, The grammar of society: the nature and dynamics of 
social norms, 2006; Eric Posner, Law and social norms, 2002. 
8 Cf. Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory, 2008. The author provides the example 
of the social norm regarding the formation of queues for obtaining services as well as for other purposes. Such 
norm emerges spontaneously from the interaction of people and has the objective of solving problems of social 
cooperation in a mutually advantageous way. Frequently, a given authority, with the power to supervise and 
regulate the formation of the line, makes said norm undergo a process of institutionalization by the provision of a 
detailed regulation regarding the conditions of access to the line, waiting order, privileges, loss or renewal of the 
right to wait in line and so on. 
9 Cf. Alan Watson, The Evolution of Western Private Law, 2001, 195: “[A] legal institution is a social institution 
that has been given legal effectiveness and is being regarded from the legal point of view. A legal institution, to 
be at all meaningful, depends on a societal institution”. Obviously, we need to consider the possibility that the 
scope of said legal institution may not coincide entirely with the scope of the social institution, or the law may 
simply ignore the second one. 
10 Geoffrey MacCormack, Anthropology and Legal Theory,  The Juridical Review, 1978, 216-32; Sally Falk 
Moore, Law and Anthropology, Biennial Review of Anthropology, 1969, 252-300. 5 
institutionalization.
11 The institutionalization process rarely avails itself of social norms in a 
“pure state”. The authorities of a given society frequently count on the legal rules previously 
institutionalized by other authorities, in other societies and at  other historical  times, as a 
prominent source of inspiration for the creation of their own rules. Said institutionalization 
process – which in practice is slow, gradual and at times done in an unreflective fashion – is 
in open contradiction to the frequently advocated model of a rational discussion conducted 
within a legislative process, which itself is structured on the basis of higher norms under a 
pyramid-like arrangement leading to a grundnorm.
12 The institutionalization process – which 
involves the reception, elaboration and or modification of certain social norms or certain legal 
norms created in other societies and historical times – can be lead, depending on the specific 
juridical tradition, mainly by legislators, judges or doctrinal writers.
13 
Economic analysis of the law proceeds in various stages, though s ome of these are not 
always explicitly articulated by the investigator. First one has to stipulate a given concept of 
well-being and how it can be attained in the context of a given interaction. Then one has to 
adopt a given theory of rationality which wil l serve to clarify both the question of the 
interacting  parties’  preferences  and  the  question  pertaining  to  their  cognitive  abilities  or 
limitations.  Then  one  tries  to  foresee  human  behavior,  based  on  the  previously  assumed 
theory of rationality, through the elaboration of specific models  of interaction in  specific 
situations (game theory). One analyses people’s interaction in the absence of a “legal” norm, 
but ideally not in the absence of a “social” norm, and see if the given interaction tends to 
decrease or increase social welfare, considering the set of strategies which the parties are 
likely to adopt. In case said interaction is believed to reduce social welfare, the scholar then 
tries to study which kind of legal rules could be devised to induce the parties to interact in a 
way  to  increase  their  own  welfare  and  or  to  increase  the  welfare  of  third  parties.  Once 
potentially beneficial rules are identified, one has to evaluate the cost of their implementation 
by the authorities responsible for the administration of the law. Only rules whose adoption 
would  bring  more  benefits  than  harm,  considering  their  implementation  cost,  should  be 
welcomed by the legislator or by the authority responsible for the administration of the law. 
                                                           
11 Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory, 2008. 
12 Cf. James Gordley, The Future of European Contract Law on the Basis of Europe’s Heritage, European 
Review of Contract Law, 2005, 174 (discussing the lack of understanding on the part of the French legislator 
with regard to the content of the civil code which it was promulgating). A similar pattern can be seen in the 
enactment of the Brazilian civil code of 1916 and, for that matter, the civil code of 2002 as well. Most of 
criticism directed at and the amendments made to the civil code of 1916, before it went into force, had nothing to 
do with the content of said code but were rather related to its linguistic style. One can remember here the 
notorious polemic between Rui Barbosa, on the one hand, and Ernesto Carneiro Ribeiro, on the other. 
13 Cf. R. C. van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal History, 1987; id., 
Uma introdução histórica ao direito privado, 2
nd ed., 1999. 6 
Under the analysis conducted in the next sections, we will assume, for the most part, that 
parties will prefer to pursue strategies which are less costly to them or which brings them 
greater expected benefits. It is not entirely clear, however, whether we would be relaxing this 
assumption, or more likely, whether we would simply be enlarging the notion of costs and 
benefits by positing, for instance, that in certain contexts parties will be more altruistically 
motivated  or  that  social  norms  will  significantly  alter  the  balance  of  costs  and  benefits 
attached  to  a  given  action.  We  will  not  be  assuming  that  there  are  significant  cognitive 
limitations or errors incurred by the parties in the assessment of the costs and benefits of their 
actions  or  that  there  are  such  significant  limitations  and  errors  in  the  assessment  of  the 
likelihood of the materialization of remote risks, a theme which has been extensively explored 
since the work of Kahneman and Tversky.
14 Some of the conclusions we have drawn in the 
remainder of this paper may (or may not) have to be modified in the light of new assumptions 
about certain cognitive limitations and biases. We will also assume, for the most part, that 
assigning liability to the injurer – whenever the sum of harm avoidance costs is lesser than the 
expected  amount  of  harm  –  is  both  conducive  to  the  creation  of  a  greater  share  of 
endowments and resources, thus increasing social welfare, as well as to a fair allocation of 
the  costs  which  would  have  to  be  incurred  in  order  to  produce  this  “public  good”.  This 
assumption can be relaxed in many different ways, such as, for instance, by assuming that, in 
certain situations, there is a fundamental asymmetry when it comes to who is likely to find 
himself or herself in the role of the injurer or the victim, calling for different measures to 
redress the imbalance. Or, for instance, by assuming that the conduct of the injurer creates 
greater benefits (possibly even to the victim) than the protection of said victim against the risk 
of harm, or that the victim would be in a better position to avoid her own harm and that it 
would be just to allocate the prevention costs to her. 
 
IV. Clarifying the concepts 
Generally speaking, a person might be held liable to another’s damage under two very broad 
and somewhat  different criteria: negligence and strict liability. We are  well aware of the 
subtleties surrounding the notions of negligence (also known as faute or culpa) and strict 
liability in different jurisdictions,
15 as well as about the employment of certain ideas such as 
the concept of the  duty of  care  in  the common law world,
16 but we think that these are 
                                                           
14  Daniel  Kahneman,  Paul  Slovic  and  Amos  Tversky  (eds.),  Judgement  Under  Uncertainty:  Heuristics  and 
Biases, 1982. 
15 On their historical origins, cf. Reinhard Zimmermann,  The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition, 1996, 1004-1013, 1033-1035, 1095-1142. 
16 Certain authors criticize the concept and consider it to be an empty vessel, designed to accommodate and give 7 
peripheral issues which do not prevent us from developing a relatively uniform conception of 
the respective criteria of liability.
17 Under the first one, presuming the damage is somehow 
linked with the active or passive conduct of the defendant, there will be liability only if said 
person  actually  fails  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  prevent  the  accident/damage  from 
occurring. One thing which need not concern us now is how to allocate the burden of proof 
regarding the adoption or non-adoption – by the defendant – of such necessary steps, should 
said burden be placed on the plaintiff/victim or on the defendant/injurer? In either case, we 
will be talking about the negligence criterion of liability if the defendant’s liability is said to 
be based upon the non-adoption of certain necessary steps to avoid the danger of an incoming 
accident and its ensuing damage.
18 Under the second one, again  presuming the damage is 
somehow linked with the active or passive conduct of the defendant, there will be liability as 
long as the accident/damage is the result of the materialization of a type of risk which, 
according to the law, should be borne by the de fendant regardless of his fault. Another 
standard of liability, albeit less commonly used, holds the defendant liable only if the damage 
is intentionally caused by him.
19 This is a way to alleviate the defendant’s responsibility, 
giving him greater control over when he will be held accountable for the damage caused, for 
accountability depends on his will alone. Moreover, intentions are harder to prove in court. 
One could say that such standard is of no use if the defendant is already considered liable 
either for negligence or in a strict way, since liability will be found regardless of the presence 
or absence of the intention to cause harm. This standard will therefore be employed only in a 
residual manner, when neither negligence nor strict liability is employed. One question which 
should  not  be  confused  with  the  preceding  discussion  –which  was  concerned  with  the 
identification  of  the  existing  criteria  of  liability  –  is  related  to  the  need,  under  certain 
circumstances, to somehow punish those who intentionally cause harm through, for instance, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
expression to different policy concerns. Cf., e.g., Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care Factors: a Selection from the 
Judicial Menus, in: The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming, ed. Cane and Stapleton, 
1998, 59-95. 
17 Though the roman jurists provided many different examples of negligent conduct, the concept of negligence 
itself has never been defined with any degree of accuracy in the romanist tradition. From the examples, however, 
one can catch glimpses of the underlying concept. Cf., on attempted definitions, James Gordley and Arthur 
Taylor von Mehren,  An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Private Law: Readings, Cases, Materials, 
2006, 353-364. 
18 What are these steps is a question which will normally have to be answered case by case, according to the 
existing circumstances. However, different branches of the law and special regulations may mandate the 
adoption of specific steps which are designed to reduce the risk of an accident. One can consult the rules clearly 
articulated in the Principles of European Law on Non -Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to 
Another, cf. Christian von Bar (ed.), PEL Liab. Dam., Article 3:102. 
19 One should bear in mind here the fact that “intention” is an ambiguous concept. It might refer to the fact that 
the injurer intended to engage in a dangerous conduct without taking precautions to avert the risk of harm to the 
victim, knowing that there was a not insignificant chance of it occurring, even though he did not intend that the 
victim suffer that kind of harm. Or it might refer to the fact that the injurer wanted the victim to suffer a given 
kind of harm. Cf. Christian von Bar (ed.), PEL Liab. Dam., Article 3:101. 8 
an increase in the amount of damages which should be indemnified.
20 Whether or not such 
punishment should be exacted has nothing to do with the question of what was the standard of 
liability of the injurer. It could have been negligence, strict liability or intentional harm. There 
are still other standards or criteria of liability besides the ones which have already been 
alluded to. 
Let us focus on negligence. Someone who is in a position to abate the risk of an accident 
and its ensuing damage by taking certain preventative measures, diminishing the chances that 
such accident/damage will ever occur, has a duty to do so under certain circumstances. If 
these measures are not taken, assuming the circumstances which require the m are present, 
then the person might be held responsible for the resultant damage. We will consider his 
omission to be culpable or negligent conduct. On the other hand, if certain preventative 
measures – which could have impeded the accident – are not taken because they are not 
required  under  the  circumstances,  then  there  will  be  no  negligence  and  consequently  no 
liability for the ensuing damage. The reason there is no liability under the last scenario is the 
fact that the defendant has presumably done everything which was required of him to prevent 
the  accident  from  occurring.  The  real  problem  is  ascertaining  when  certain  preventative 
measures, whose aim is to diminish the likelihood of an accident, should be taken. Based on 
the famous Hand Formula widely used by the economic analysis of law literature,
21 but with 
some modifications, we suggest that a given range of preventative measures should be taken 
when the cost of these measures, through the employment of certain accident prevention 
technologies, is lesser than the expected amount of damage without such measures minus the 
expected amount of damage with their employment.
22 The expected amount of damage would 
be calculated by its likely extent multiplied by the probability of its occurrence. The first part 
                                                           
20 Cf., e.g., Brazilian civil code, arts. 1.258 and 1.259 (which provide for liability up to ten times the amount of 
damages suffered by the victim when the injurer is a neighbor who deliberately erects a building which invades 
the victim’s land). It doesn’t matter what was the injurer’s criterion of liability towards his or her neighbor, 
which seems to be strict liability since indemnity will be due even if the incident could not have been avoided. 
However, punishment will be triggered by the establishment of bad faith on the part of the injurer. 
21 Which was explicitly articulated by Judge Hand in United States v. Carrol Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 
1947). 
22 To illustrate the point in a mathematical notation let us suppose that the likely exten t of the damage, if it were 
ever to occur, would be approximately 10.000. Let us also suppose that if no preventative measures were to be 
undertaken, said damage would materialize in 10% of the cases in which the defendant engaged in a given 
conduct or activity. Then the expected amount of damage, without any preventative measure, would be 1.000 (= 
10.000ext x 0.1p). Suppose the probability of the damage’s occurrence falls to 6% if preventative measure A, 
which costs 300, is undertaken; to 4% if preventative measure B, which costs 500, is undertaken and to 3% if 
both measures are undertaken. We would have the following formulas: 300cost < 400 (=1.000ED no M – 600ED with 
M); 500cost < 600 (= 1.000ED  no  M – 400ED  with  M); 800cost > 700 (=1.000ED  no  M – 300ED  with  M). Precautionary 
measures A or B, when employed alone, produce a net gain in social welfare equivalent to 100 which is the 
amount left after we deduct the cost of such precautionary measures from the amount of the saved costs in 
expected liability (400saved – 300cost = 100; 600saved – 500cost = 100). Unless the victim is risk averse – as it 
frequently happens – or other policy objective dictate otherwise, the injurer should not be found negligent if he 
chooses to adopt precautionary measure A instead of B. 9 
of the equation represents the costs which would have to be incurred through the adoption of 
certain precautionary measures. The second part of the equation informs us the size of the 
decrease in expected damages when such precautionary measures are employed. Obviously, a 
decrease  in  expected  damages  means  an  increase  in  the  welfare  of  the  victim.  However, 
absent special considerations such as redistribution of wealth or the need to provide insurance 
to the victim, social welfare would only be increased if the cost of those measures to the 
injurer, the first part of the equation, was smaller than the benefit to the victim, the second 
part of said equation. If different preventative measures were cost-justified on their own, but 
could  not  all  be  pursued  at  the  same  time  due  to  various  reasons,  or  if  their  combined 
employment  would  no  longer  be  cost-justified,  then  the  defendant  should  employ  those 
measures which prove to be most effective in the task of preventing accidents. 
 
V. Incentive structures and welfare 
The tort regime might try to achieve three different goals which are not always compatible 
with each other, namely, incentives for the injurer and the victim to behave more carefully, 
risk sharing between them and insurance against harm to the victim.
23 We’ll concentrate on 
incentives, especially for the injurer/defendant, who is assumed to be both rational and risk-
neutral. Incentives are meant to steer the parties’ behavior towards the fulfillment of some 
desirable social objective, such as the maximization of social welfare, through the reduction 
of the sum of precautionary measure costs incurred by the parties, expected damage costs 
suffered by the victim and the administrative costs involved in the use of the legal system and 
the  courts  to  settle  disputes.  These  incentives  can  be  created  by  two  devices,  either  by 
manipulating  the  criteria  of  liability  –  specially  the  choice  between  negligence  and  strict 
liability – or by manipulating the amount of the damage award to be given to the victim. Let 
us assume, for the moment, that the damage award or indemnification will be roughly equal to 
the actual damage suffered by the victim. 
Under a regime of strict liability, depending on the circumstances, the defendant may or 
may not have sufficient incentives to try to prevent the occurrence of an accident. If he tries to 
do so by taking some preventative measures the likelihood of an accident taking place as well 
as the expected amount of harm for which he would be responsible will certainly decrease. 
The problem is that, unlike the regime of negligence, even if he takes these preventative 
measures  he  will  almost  always  be  responsible  for  the  remaining  risk  of  harm  to  the 
plaintiff/victim.  Therefore,  when  deciding  whether  or  not  to  take  the  aforementioned 
                                                           
23 Cf. Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 2004. 10 
measures,  he  will  certainly  compute  not  only  their  cost  but  also  the  remaining  expected 
damage.  Both  negligence  and  strict  liability  can  provide  incentives  for  the  adoption  of 
existing as well as new accident prevention technologies as long as their overall cost, plus the 
remaining risk of liability in the case of strict liability, is lesser than the expected amount of 
damage without their employment. Otherwise the defendant will prefer to be held liable rather 
than incurring higher prevention costs. Punitive damages – that is, increasing the damage 
award above the actual damages suffered by the victim – and other kinds of sanction, such as 
penal sanctions, can solve this incentive problem. Incentives towards more careful conduct 
can sometimes be backed by the law even if the precautionary measures which they call for 
are  apparently  not  cost-justified,  because  said  incentives  are  deemed  important  for  the 
fulfillment of different policy objectives such as the redistribution of wealth or the provision 
of insurance to the victim, thus increasing social welfare in non-obvious ways. One should 
bear in mind the fact that these same policy objectives might also require a weaker response 
from the law. They might demand only that the injurer bears the victim’s harm, not that he 
takes steps to try to prevent such harm from occurring, thus diminishing the importance of 
providing incentives for the adoption of more careful conduct. 
There is a difference between the ideal cost of precautionary measures relevant to the 
negligence  inquiry  as  formulated  in  this  article  and  as  traditionally  formulated  in  the 
economic analysis of law literature. The latter formulation is slightly simpler, since it seems 
to assume that precautionary measures will reduce the risk of an accident and its resulting 
damage to almost zero. Thus the well-known Hand Formula states that the injurer should take 
certain precautionary measures whenever their cost is lesser than the expected amount of 
damage without their employment. On the other hand, we suggest that such measures should 
be taken whenever their cost is lesser than the expected amount of damage without their 
employment minus the expected amount of damage with their employment. According to our 
suggestion, both negligence and strict liability would continue to provide incentives for the 
injurer  under  similar  circumstances  since  the  sum  of  the  remaining  expected  amount  of 
damage – after the implementation of the prescribed precautionary measures – and the cost of 
such  measures  would  never  surpass  the  expected  amount  of  damage  without  their 
employment.
24 According to the traditional formulation, strict liability would cease to provide 
                                                           
24 One could argue that both standards are equivalent and that negligence could, therefore, be abolished. Three 
factors, however, militate against this view. First, each standard has a different effect on the level of activity of 
the parties. Second, the risk of harm covered by strict liability may be more narrowly defined than that covered 
by the negligence standard and/or the indemnification due to the victim may be capped. Third, the negligence 
inquiry could come back through the back door when deciding questions related to causation. The latter is due to 
the fact that, on a psychological level, people tend to attribute a causal nexus only to events for which one can be 11 
incentives while negligence would continue to do so if the sum which was previously referred 
to  were  to  become  greater  than  said  expected  amount  of  damage  while  the  cost  of 
precautionary measures remained below it. Such a negligence standard would be considered a 
more  stringent  one,  setting  out  a  more  demanding  duty  of  care.  Since  the  definition  of 
negligence is something which is left to the discretion of the legal system and the courts, 
which might try to pursue different policy objectives, and given the possibility of judicial 
error in the application of the standard, however it may be defined, such standard can be made 
even more stringent. However, such negligence standard would cease to provide incentives if 
the cost of the precautionary measures demanded by it were to exceed the expected liability of 
the injurer without any such measures. If we were to consider only the cost of precautionary 
measures,  disregarding  how  difficult  it  would  be  to  verify  compliance  with  them  by  the 
courts, it would be possible to say, adopting the formulation of negligence as traditionally 
found in the economic analysis of law literature, that it will continue to provide incentives 
over a wider range of circumstances than strict liability. This is the case when the cost of 
preventative  measures  alone  is  lesser  than  the  expected  amount  of  damage  without  their 
employment, but greater than such expected amount of damage if said cost is combined with 
the remaining risk of damage. In such a case the injurer who is held liable for negligence will 
have incentives to take preventative measures while the one who is held strictly liable will 
have no such incentives. On the other hand, if precautionary measures are hard to verify, strict 
liability – or even negligence with a reversal of the burden of proof – may on average provide 
incentives over a wider range of circumstances than negligence. Obviously, incentives are 
interpreted here as incentives to take care, for under strict liability the party who is held liable 
will always have incentives to reduce the level of his activities up to the point where his 
marginal gains from said activities equals his marginal costs, assuming that the risk of harm 
for which he would be liable increases as the injurer engages in the dangerous activities more 
frequently. The negligence criterion of liability does not have a similar impact on the injurer’s 
activity level.
25 Both criteria can therefore provide incentives for the injurer to take care, 
albeit with some differences, but the same cannot be said about incentives for the injurer to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
held responsible, cf. Steven Pinker, The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature, 2007, 65-
73, 83-87, 208-233. 
25 One could make a distinction, following the economic analysis of law literature, between the level of care of 
the injurer and his level of activity. There is no clear meaning attached to the two notions within said literature. 
Some equate the level of care with the question of how careful a person conducts his affairs and the level of 
activity with the question of how often a person engages in a given conduct. Others equate the level of care with 
the range of precautionary measures which can be verified by the courts and the level of activity with the range 
of precautionary measures which cannot be so verified. We are using the distinction wh ile employing the first 
meaning identified above as can be readily seen by the context. Cf., on the distinction and its meaning, Giuseppe 
Dari-Mattiacci, On the optimal scope of negligence, Review of Law and Economics, 2005, 331-364. 12 
reduce  his  activity  level:  only  strict  liability  can  provide  the  latter  kind  of  incentive. 
Sometimes we have to make a trade-off between both kinds of incentives: to take care and to 
reduce  one’s  activity  level.  Considering  only  the  latter  incentive,  we  can  say  that  social 
welfare will be improved by the adoption of strict liability if it is more important to reduce the 
injurer’s activity level rather than the victim’s. 
Questions related to the provision of incentives can get even more tricky if we take into 
account the fact that, sometimes, the law may try to subside the activity of the injurer for 
various reasons, reducing the level of care demanded of him or not attempting to reduce his 
activity level while, at other times, the law may try to vigorously discourage his activity. This 
is the case when his conduct generates asymmetrical positive and negative externalities. Any 
conduct or activity – such as driving, erecting a building, operating a power plant, extracting 
oil  and  other  mineral  resources,  using  pesticides,  manufacturing  and  utilizing  all  sorts  of 
products, etc. – creates risks as well as benefits to others outside of an exchange setting; that 
is, such risks and benefits are not created through market transactions or contracts. Those 
affected by the activity do not agree to be harmed in exchange for money, nor do they pay the 
one responsible for the activity to give them a benefit. The law has to deal here with the 
problem  of  negative  and  positive  externalities.  Generally  speaking,  absent  special 
considerations,  negative  externalities  should  be  discouraged  while  positive  externalities 
should be encouraged by the law. We bump into difficulties, however, when both kinds of 
externality are generated by the same conduct and, moreover, when there are no other ways to 
generate  the  positive  externalities  without  also  generating  the  negative  ones.  When  said 
conduct, which creates a given risk of damage, also confers some benefits on the victim or on 
third parties we have to balance the opposing factors and correspondingly adjust the required 
level of care or level of activity of the injurer to reflect a workable compromise between them. 
For  instance,  to  denounce  a  possible  car  theft  to  the  authorities  creates  the  risk  that  the 
innocent  person  in  possession  of  the  possibly  stolen  property  may  suffer  unjustifiable 
economic, emotional and reputational harm by being the subject of an investigation, but it 
also helps to diminish crime and secure a healthy second-hand car market which benefits 
everyone, including the victim of harm. That is why Brazilian case-law apparently will only 
hold the injurer liable if he acted with the intent to cause harm.
26 This is a way of encouraging 
the beneficial, but potentially harmful, act of denouncing crimes to the authorities. Besides the 
case of beneficial risky conducts, we can also identify the closely related category  of risky 
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28.08.1996.  Cf.  also  Apelação  nº  112587-5,  5ª  Câmara  Cível  do  TAMG,  Muriaé,  Rel.  Juiz  Garcia  Leão, 
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precautionary measures as problematic for the establishment of proper incentives. These are 
precautionary measures which not only reduce one type of risk, thus creating a benefit, but 
also  increase  another  type  to  the  victim  or  to  third  parties.
27  For instance, to vaccinate 
someone may prevent this person from contracting a given disease as well as help to arrest the 
dissemination of said disease among the population, but it may also create the risk of 
collateral or unintended effects. Even if the  decision to vaccinate the specific individual was 
considered to be negligent because she faced a higher risk of suffering from the vaccination’s 
side effects than the risk of contracting the disease, the injurer’s liability should be decreased 
taking into account the beneficial effects of vaccination to the population at large. On many 
occasions the law has to provide incentives for the adoption of the least risky precautionary 
measures while not entirely disregarding the beneficial effects produced by the more risky 
ones, such as when a medical treatment can be effectuated through the administration of two 
different drugs which pose a higher and a lesser degree of risk of side effects. When there is a 
reversal of the burden of proof the injurer might even be tempted to adopt a more risky 
precautionary measure, which can be verified by the courts, instead of a less risky one, which 
cannot be so verified, in order to escape liability. Establishing the proper incentives can also 
be a tricky matter when we have to confront issues like the insolvency of the injurer, his 
responsibility for the conduct of third parties, uncertainties regarding causation or the amount 
of harm, the abnormal vulnerability of a particular victim which causes her a greater than 
average harm, etc. 
 
VI. Choosing between negligence and strict liability 
The proper choice between negligence and strict liability can be illuminated by, at least, two 
different  theories.  Under  the  first  one,  what  matters  is  an  imbalance  in  the  degree  of 
reciprocity  between  the  risks  and  benefits  created  by  the  conduct  of  the  injurer  and  the 
conduct of the victim, combined with the need to reduce the activity level of one of the 
parties.
28 Both aspects – lack of reciprocity between risks and benefits as well as the need to 
control activity levels – are mutually reinforcing justifications for the imposition of strict 
liability. The activity level of one of the parties should be reduced if the probability and, 
consequently,  the  risk  of  accidents  increases  at  a  greater  rate  when  said  party’s  activity 
becomes more frequent. Let us consider the conduct of the injurer. The risk of harm and the 
benefits created by the injurer’s conduct can be felt directly by the victim or by third parties. 
If, assuming reasonable care, the externalized benefits are roughly equal to the external costs, 
                                                           
27 Cf. Ariel Porat, Offsetting risks, Michigan Law Review, 2007, 243-276. 
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there is no net external harm on average associated with the injurer’s activity when conducted 
reasonably. Let us assume the same can be said about the conduct of the victim. If we also 
assume that there is no need to reduce either the injurer’s or the victim’s activity level, then 
the injurer should be liable for negligence. The victim would of course unnecessarily reduce 
her activity level if she is considered to be the residual bearer of the harm, but that negative 
consequence would be offset by a corresponding reduction in litigation and collection costs 
which would have to be incurred if the injurer were to be considered the residual bearer. On 
the other hand, if the injurer’s conduct externalizes risk of harm to a significantly greater 
extent than benefits, even if he takes reasonable care, while the victim’s conduct externalizes 
roughly the same amount of risks and benefits, and if there is also a need to reduce the 
injurer’s level of activity, then said injurer should be held strictly liable for the harm he 
causes. Observe here that both criteria of liability are assumed to produce similar incentives 
for the adoption of more careful conduct by the injurer, so that the choice between them 
hinges only on the factors identified above regarding reciprocity of risks and benefits and the 
proper level of activity of the parties. If we were to relax that assumption, then we would have 
to make a trade-off between the fulfillment of the objective of providing incentives for the 
adoption  of  more  careful  conduct  by  the  injurer  and  the  objective  of  providing  (or  not 
providing) incentives for the reduction of his activity level, in order to decide which criterion 
of liability would be the most suitable under the circumstances. 
Under the second theory, strict liability should be imposed whenever the costs associated 
with the implementation of the negligence standard by the courts, such as the information 
costs which would have to be incurred in order to verify the injurer’s compliance with the 
precautionary measures  demanded by  said  standard,  are  greater than the benefits  brought 
about  by  the  application  of  the  referred  standard  (like  improved  incentives  towards  the 
adoption  of  more  careful  conduct).  In  fact,  when  the  compliance  with  the  prescribed 
precautionary measures is very hard to verify, the injurer might have no incentives at all to 
take these measures. The application of the negligence standard would then fail to provide the 
necessary incentives to the injurer.
29 We are assuming here that, whenever information is 
costly, strict liability is better than negligence in terms of providing incentives towards the 
adoption  of  more  careful  conduct.  However, such incentives  can  also  be  generated by 
applying the negligence criterion of liability with a reversal of the burden of proof. If the 
injurer/defendant  is  charged  with  the  task  of  proving  that  he  did  take  the  prescribed 
precautionary measures, then he will have an incentive to take them. Thus both strict liability 
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and negligence with a reversal of the burden of proof can provide proper incentives for the 
injurer  to  behave  more  carefully.  We  have  said  nothing  so  far  about  the  provision  of 
incentives  for the reduction of the injurer’s activity level. Only strict liability will serve, 
however,  if  we  take  the  need  to  provide  the  latter  kind  of  incentive  into  account,  since 
negligence – even with the reversal of the burden of proof – might not provide incentives for 
the injurer to reduce his level of activity considering the fact that he may very well escape 
liability altogether if he is able to prove that he took the necessary precautionary measures. 
If, after considering the two theories discussed above, we opt for the negligence standard, 
we will then have to identify which precautionary measures should be taken into account in 
order to evaluate the injurer’s conduct. On that matter all we can say is that the injurer should 
take the set of measures which prove to be the most efficient in the task of reducing the 
overall social costs associated with an accident such as the sum of precautionary measure 
costs  incurred  by  the  parties,  expected  damage  costs  suffered  by  the  victim  and  the 
administrative costs involved in the use of the legal system and the courts to settle disputes. 
Legal counsel for the parties as well as judges deciding cases should try to discover the root 
causes of the accident, the probability of it occurring, which measures could have avoided 
such accident, the cost and degree of effectiveness of these measures, the cost of verifying 
compliance with them by the court, as well as other pertinent issues. In so doing they could 
avail themselves of expert testimony from scientists, engineers or anyone in a position to 
clarify the relevant issues. The use of statistical data would be welcomed. One could also 
consult the growing literature on accident prevention and analysis.
30 The task of finding out 
which precautionary measures should be taken could be made easier by consulting building 
regulations, traffic regulations, waste disposal regulations and all sorts of regulations issued 
by public authorities. One could also consult the vast repertoire of technical standards for 
many  different  kinds  of  activity  which  are  published  by  organizations  such  as  the  
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and its national counterparts such as the 
Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas (ABNT) as well as many others, several of these 
standards contain safety rules which are sometimes copied by government s when they issue 
regulations; though one should bear in mind the fact that these standards do not exhaust the 
whole range of precautionary measures which should be taken and, thus, compliance with 
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them should not automatically be considered careful behavior. We should also be aware of the 
fact that if the cause of the accident had nothing to do with the non-compliance with the 
measures prescribed in those standards, the injurer should not be held liable solely for the fact 
that  he  did  not  comply  with  them  (unless,  of  course,  policy  reasons  require  otherwise). 
Precautionary  measures  should  be  deemed  relevant  only  when  they  contribute  to  the 
enhancement  of  social  welfare  as  clarified  above.  Once  the  court  identified  which 
precautionary measures were required under the circumstances to comply with the negligence 
standard, it could make a creative allocation of the burden of proof as well as make ample use 
of  special  presumptions  in  order  to  settle  the  various  issues  relevant  to  a  finding  of 
negligence.  One  can  see  that  the  administrative  costs  involved  in  the  application  of  the 
negligence  standard,  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  judicial  error,  can  become  significant 
depending on the degree of refinement and attention to detail devoted to it. 
 
VII. The impact of new accident prevention technologies on civil liability 
We can imagine a few scenarios created by the development of improved accident prevention 
technologies. The cost of precautionary measures which employ them can be higher or lower 
than the cost of those measures which do not yet do so. We have to identify the best set of 
precautionary measures, prior to the advent of new accident prevention technologies, in order 
to ascertain whether or not the new precautionary measures which employ such technologies 
will be desirable. Once we do that, we can compare the net gains in terms of social welfare – 
relative to a state without any precautionary measures – produced by the adoption of the older 
and the newer sets of precautionary measures. Such gains in social welfare, for the sake of the 
simplified analysis we are doing here, will be the sum we find after deducting the cost of a 
given  set  of  precautionary  measures  from  the  size  of  the  reduction  in  expected  damages 
generated by its adoption. If the gain in social welfare produced by the newer set is greater 
than the equivalent gain produced by the older set, then the overall level of social welfare will 
be increased by the adoption of this newer set of precautionary measures. On the other hand, 
if such gain is actually smaller than the gain produced by the older set of measures, than the 
adoption of the new set of measures would in fact decrease the overall level of social welfare 
compared to the previously adopted optimal set of measures. When evaluating these issues we 
have  to  focus  on,  at  least,  two  factors:  what  is  the  cost  of  a  given  set  of  precautionary 
measures and to what extent does it reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of a given type 
of accident and its ensuing damage. If we reach the conclusion, after a careful examination of 
the pertinent issues, that the new set of precautionary measures should in fact be adopted, then 17 
we will have to analyze which doctrinal devices would be the most suitable ones to achieve 
the goal of welfare maximization. First we will focus on the two factors identified above: the 
cost  of the new set  of  precautionary measures, on the one hand, and  the degree of their 
effectiveness in reducing the likelihood of harm, on the other hand. We will try to identify 
different scenarios created by the interplay of these factors and how they affect the adequacy 
of the legal regime governing civil liability. Then we will briefly mention the question of the 
ability of the courts to verify compliance with the prescribed precautionary measures and its 
impact on the suitability of the previously cited legal regime. 
Whenever the cost of new precautionary measures remains equal to or becomes lower 
than the cost of older measures, while decreasing the likelihood of an accident, the injurer 
should be held responsible for the resulting harm if he does not adopt them. He will probably 
have a natural incentive to adopt the newer measures. Whenever the cost of the new measures 
increases in comparison with the older ones, but the decrease in expected damages more than 
compensates for that rise in cost, the injurer should also be liable for the resulting damage if 
he does not employ those measures. Here however the law has to provide a little bit more 
encouragement for the injurer to actually employ them, since his immediate costs will rise. On 
many occasions the law is a little hesitant to hold the injurer liable, especially if he has some 
sort of stable relationship with the victim and has the ability to shift the cost increase onto her 
shoulders. Perhaps the law does not want to disrupt a possible contractual solution to the 
problem.  One  can  remember  here  the  example  of  the  car  industry  which  was  sued  by 
disgruntled customers and consumer advocates in the 1960’s over safety issues. Back then the 
plaintiffs’ demands met with success. Closer to our time the demands of consumer groups in 
the United States that said industry incorporates an improved tire pressure monitoring system 
on some new car models have not been so successful.
31 In poorer countries the car industry 
reserves the use of air -bags, which can save many lives, mainly to luxury model cars. 
Considering that the cost of these precautionary measures would ultimately have to be borne 
by the victims, one can see why the law is so hesitant to intervene . There is yet another 
scenario  which  is  bound  to  cause  even  more  controversy.  Suppose  the  cost  of  a  new 
precautionary measure undergoes a sharp decrease in comparison with an older one, but at the 
cost of a slight increase in the risk of accident. Let us  also suppose that social welfare would 
be increased by the adoption of the new measure, despite an augmentation of risk to the 
victim. Should the injurer be considered negligent if he abandons the older and more robust 
measure in favor of the newer and less effective one? There seems to be no clear answer, for 
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if we say no then this appears to befuddle our intuitions concerning acquired rights to safety 
and the preservation of the status quo. Controversies apart, let us suppose that the injurer 
should indeed be liable under one of the scenarios identified above, we would then have to 
consider which criterion of liability would be the most suitable one under the circumstances. 
The choice between negligence and strict liability should be made only after weighting the 
relevant factors such as the need to control the activity level of one of the parties or the need 
to provide incentives to take care when the adoption of precautionary measures cannot be 
easily verified by the courts. We will not repeat here all of the arguments developed in the 
previous section of this work. We should note, nonetheless, that new accident prevention 
technologies, by altering the weight which had presumably been accorded to those factors in 
the  face  of  older  precautionary  measures,  will  certainly  affect  the  adequacy  of  old  laws, 
regulations and judicial precedents when it comes to the choice between negligence and strict 
liability. These rules may have been elaborated at a time when the available precautionary 
measures – and their verifiability by the courts – dictated a criterion of liability which is no 
longer optimal under current circumstances. It may have become much easier or harder for 
courts to assess the conduct of injurers and or victims. The frequency in which the parties 
engage in a given activity may have a different correlation with the proportional increase (or 
lack thereof) in the risk of accidents than it had when the old rules were fashioned. The very 
precautionary measures prescribed by the old rules, used in the assessment of negligence, may 
have become ill-adapted to the present circumstances. 
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